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ABSTRACT 
In the recent years, the world has experienced devastating losses due to terrorist attacks. 
Research in the fields of causes of terrorism is abundant, but the amount of research on the end 
of terrorism does not equally measure up. This paper aims to add to the research focused on 
analyzing the causes and factors which cause terrorist groups to transition away from violence.  
This paper introduces an original categorization of the factors which generate this 
transition. Factors belong to two categories: internal --decisions made by the terrorist 
organization, and external--actions or features pertaining to organization outside of non-terrorist 
organizations. These factors will be illustrated through examples of terrorist organizations and 
their activity. The purpose of this paper is to provide an original, comparative overview of those 
factors that may best illustrate the study of counterterrorism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 9/11 attacks, the world of security studies has been focused on studying why 
and how terrorist organizations emerge and operate. Most existing research on terrorist groups 
has been focused on the terrorist groups’ origin, but not on their transitions away from violence.  
The aim of this paper is to explore under which circumstances terrorist groups or 
organizations abandon violence, dismantle, or transform into mainstream organizations. These 
are instances when groups abandon their past, fringe behavior. Most of the times, this also means 
abandoning violence and accepting negotiation and compromise as the main way to reach the 
group’s goals, or giving up those goals altogether. Describing the circumstances of such 
transitions will in part also reveal what some likely solutions to terrorism may be.  
A comparative analysis will contrast the transformation of different terrorist groups 
taking in account the factors which make this transformation most likely. This paper 
acknowledges that there are many different political and strategic instruments that determine the 
transformation or termination of a terrorist organization. In spite of possible multiple causality, 
often times, case studies in the literature identify one major factor that likely contributed the 
most to such transformations. Six such factors, which are prevalent in the “end of terrorism” 
literature, will be organized in two original categories and will be the focus of this study. After 
defining and describing factors and categories, the paper proceeds to illustrate each factor with a 
discussion of examples drawn from various historical time frames and geographical contexts. A 
comparative overview and analysis of the examples will provide the reader with an original 
typology and categorization of examples in the “end of terrorism” literature. These factors will 
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be presented in a systematic way and illustrated though concrete examples, thus making an 
original contribution to the “end of terrorism” literature. 
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DEFINITIONS, CATEGORIES, AND FACTORS 
This paper takes into consideration the difficulty of adopting a definition for terrorism 
which is globally accepted. Because there is no common definition for terrorism this paper will 
be adopting a definition from the research of Seth Jones and Martin Libicki in How Terrorist 
Groups End (2008). “Terrorism involves the use of politically motivated violence against 
noncombatants to cause intimidation or fear among a target audience” (pg. 3) by non-state actors.  
A terrorist group or organization will be defined in this paper as an assembly of 
individuals who operate outside the state entity and use terrorism to achieve their objectives. Due 
to the collective ideology and agenda of the group, the organizational cluster of terrorists are 
controlled to follow a strategic direction (Jones and Libicki, 2008). The control and strategic 
leadership provided in terrorist groups is an important factor in creating the large scale attacks 
that an individual would not be able to create (Shapiro, 2013). The transformation of a terrorist 
group is defined in this paper as the termination of the use of terrorism. The factors which are 
categorized into this paper show how decisions made by the terrorist organization, or an entity 
outside of the organization can generate the groups’ movement away from violence.  
The two original categories in this paper take into account the origin of intent in a 
terrorist group’s transition away from violence. Such intent can be internal or external to the 
terrorist group itself. Internal intent means that the group itself, through one of its actions or 
decisions brings about its transformation. External intent means that a factor/entity external to 
the terrorist group brought about such change.   
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Category I: Internal Factors 
The first category consists of internal factors which can attenuate terrorist groups’ violent 
behavior. Internal factors are ones which deal with initiatives or decisions taken within the 
terrorist group that lead it to transition away from violence. This category involves terrorist 
organizations splintering and merging with other terrorist groups. It also analyzes groups 
merging into mainstream politics, while transitioning away from terroristic strategies and 
violence, once their goals are fulfilled. Terrorist organizations all around the world have better 
access to each other due to advancing globalization, terrorists have the opportunity to take 
advantage of this and gain help and support from other terrorist groups, the decision regarding 
participation in terrorist group networks has an effect on the groups’ transition away from 
violence. 
Splinter Away From Main Group 
The first category deals with how the internal decision made within the group can, 
directly or indirectly, be fatal to the existence of the group. Members wanting to splinter away 
from one terrorist group, to merge into another terrorist group can be dangerous to the survival of 
the first terrorist organization. Many terrorist groups are tied together through similarities in 
ideologies and alignment of political goals, so the movement of members from one group to 
another is highly possible. The opposite of this convergence is competition between terrorist 
groups. Terrorist groups fight for the same resources, recruitment, safe houses and fund 
generation. The study of How Terrorist Groups End (Jones and Libicki, 2008) lists a number of 
terrorist groups within the Palestinian territory who follow this idea, groups such as “Palestinian 
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Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command, and a 
variety of Fatah organizations, such as al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades” (p.13). 
The movement of members from one group, the center, to another group is labeled as 
splintering by Jones and Libicki (2008). Individual members engage in a cost-benefit analysis 
and reach the conclusion that they will be better equip in reaching their goals if they joined 
another group and disaffiliate away from their first terrorist organization. Studies have shown 
how splintering occurs in the presence of uncertainty and insecurity of one’s terrorist 
organization (Mesquita, p.406). A historic example of splintering takes place within the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), as a section of this republican militia, the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army split from the main group in the late 1960s. A further divide in the organization took place 
when a radical group, the Real IRA, broke from the Provisionals, during the 1990s, when the 
peace process leading to Good Friday Agreement was taking place (Mesquita, pg.400).    
Terrorist organizations are rational decision makers, in that they use all of their resources 
to “maximize their utility” (Gaibulloev & Sandler, pg. 4). Having multiple bases can be a 
positive for groups trying to not be defeated by external forces, as the government, military or 
local police would have to band together to terminate the organizations many bases; a 
collaboration which does not usually occur. Having multiple bases, and greater populations, 
within a terrorist group is also a hindrance to getting the people into mainstream politics as the 
government is less likely to please multiple viewpoints within the organization. Splintering also 
causes the central terrorist organization, the one which members are splintering from, to weaken, 
as the organization loses its members, usually the ones which are more radical in their thinking. 
This shift can cause the central organization to transition away from violence as the more violent 
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members splinter away, as seen in the splits of the IRA. The change of membership and their 
move away from the terrorist organization can generate the loss of power and control from the 
central organization as it loses members, causing it to shift away from violence. 
Shift Towards Mainstream Politics  
Another factor within the category of internal intent is a terrorist group’s shift towards 
mainstream politics, after the group has achieved its set goals. Some terrorist groups have 
converted to mainstream politics by announcing they would adopt peaceful tactics. The Euskadi 
Ta Askatasuna (ETA), which used to be an armed Basque separatist group, has used the tools of 
technology and media to convey their messages to the world, instead of resorting to violent 
terrorism. This has generated their movement to mainstream politics as the ETA announced its 
intentions to speak with the Spanish and French government in hopes of reaching a peaceful 
resolution (Tremlett, 2011). 
Terrorist groups can also be attracted to mainstream politics and transition into 
nonviolent groups through active participation in their country’s electoral process. Majority of 
the members from ETA decided to join the mainstream politics in Spain once the country moved 
into a democracy (Alonso, 2011). This allowed for the terrorist organization of the ETA to 
politically legitimize and participate in political change without the use of terrorism. Another 
example of this can be found in the former terrorist organization that has taken on peaceful 
methods of political change is the Muslim Brotherhood. The best example of the Muslim 
Brotherhood using non-violent means to political change was their participation in the 2013 
Egyptian coup of President Hosni Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood, along with other Egyptian 
citizens, were given the opportunity to create change in their country and they were successful in 
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bring down President Mubarak and electing President Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood 
member. 
A terrorist group is more likely to shift towards mainstream politics if they have 
previously attained their political goals within the country. The study done by Jones and Libicki 
also lists success in achieving political goals as an end to terrorist organizations (2008). The 
same study also discusses how 10% of analyzed cases ended due to the group meeting their 
goals. Although this is a small percentage, the study cities Irgun Zvai Leumi in Israel as a 
historic example of this factor. Although the Irgun is a terrorist organization, it met its political 
goals through a mix of terrorist strategies as well as nonviolent means. Majority of the group’s 
members transferred to a political party which spoke about the issues they cared for. The terrorist 
group’s members legitimized the process of fighting for political change by participating in an 
official electoral process and transitioning away from violence.    
Although terrorist groups may transition away from violence after attaining victory, it is 
not always just the terrorist activities which allowed them to meet their agenda (Crenshaw, 
pg.260). Some terrorist groups may have also met their goals without using violence, or because 
of the willing or unwilling contribution or input of other groups or factors. Jones and Libicki list 
the Armenian Resistance Group as one of these organizations (2008). The group advocated for 
an independent Armenian state through the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 
collapsed, without the efforts of the Armenian Resistance Group, and independence was 
achieved, but not to the group’s actions (Jones and Libicki, pg.15). Terrorist groups which have 
attained their goals, directly or indirectly, slowly transition away from violence, making their 
shift to mainstream politics more likely to occur. 
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The fulfillment of a goal can really decide whether or not a terrorist organization will 
make their transition to mainstream politics. Terrorist organizations which have goals such as 
regime change, or revolutions are unlikely to join the legal political path (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 
2014). Terrorist organizations can also make the cost benefit analysis of how their goals can be 
realistically achieved, and the group will change their goals and the ways of obtaining them in 
order to fulfill their agenda. This change occurred in the terrorist group of Hamas. Hamas 
originated in the boycott of elections as dictated by a memorandum from July 1992 (Brathwaite, 
pg.66). The group was set in their ways until 1993, which is when they realized their electoral 
boycott was keeping them from achieving their goals, and produced the shift to electoral 
participation in 1996 rose. Hamas was not achieving the political goals it had set forth previously 
and believed that participating in elections would help gain an advantage over its rival, the Fatah 
(Brathwaite, pg.67). Groups which have goals that are concrete and demand major changes are 
unlikely to achieve their agenda. In changing the groups’ goals and political aims, the terrorist 
organization takes a more nonviolent and mainstream route of political change by participating 
in the electoral process, as seen in the case of Hamas.  
Terrorist Group Networking 
Another factor which deals with internal intent and decision making is the how terrorist 
groups interact with each other in the global network. Although terrorist groups do not frequently 
interact and collaborate with each other, but when they do, there are significant systematic 
consequences. Terrorist groups can help each other as they share information, resources, 
weapons and other tools to be effective, generating a longer existence for the terrorist groups 
involved. Terrorist longevity has a direct result on policy making as the activation and 
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establishment of a terrorist group and its life cycle can cause direct harm to citizens. Eliminating 
one terrorist organization can effect another group’s survival as terrorist groups use support of 
other groups, who they may not always declare an alliance with (Phillips, 2014).  
This factor has several negatives to a terrorist organization, as building up skill, resources 
and attacks attracts more attention from the government. A grass roots operation can become a 
full organization and this can be dangerous to the existence of an organization as governments 
would use efforts to eliminate them. Some terrorist groups have refused to create this network of 
aid with other groups as to avoid the attention it garners. Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (Shining 
Path) is suspected to being one of the organizations which follows that train of thought when it 
comes to collaboration with other terrorist groups. (Phillips, pg.337). The literature shows that 
networking and sharing of resources can determine a terrorist group’s longevity and success, 
conversely, the lack of shared resources or networks, voluntary or involuntary, can bring the 
demise or end of the group. The paradoxical case of the Shining Path, where they made a 
voluntary decision not to networking with other groups, weakened the group over time and 
ceased terrorist activity (Brown, 2010; Phillips, 2014). The decision a terrorist group makes 
internally, whether to have relations with other terrorist group, can be a contributing factor in the 
longevity and the generation of violent attacks though the organization.  
Category II: External Factors 
The second original category of this paper deals with actions and initiatives taken from 
the outside of the terrorist group, through exterior entities, that lead the terrorist group away from 
violence. The factors which this category will discuss involves the government type of the host 
country, as certain regimes are more susceptible to compromises and treaties with terrorist 
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organizations. This category also analyzes the views on policing and military intervention to 
terminate terrorist groups. Following the thought of exterior attacks like military and police 
intervention, terrorists groups can also start to transition away from violence after the elimination 
of their leader.  
Regime Type 
The first factor within their category deaths with the regime type of the host country of a 
specific terrorist group, as it is an important factor in attenuating violence or eventually ending 
terrorism. In democracies, a violent and harsh response to terrorism causes the public to retreat 
their support away from its governments and creates a larger pool of recruitment for terrorist 
groups (Daxecker and Hess, 2013). The article “Repression hurts: Coercive government 
responses and the demise of terrorist campaigns”, talks about how the regime type of a country 
has an effect on the terrorist activity in the region, as the policy decisions will either feed the 
membership of the terrorist group or eradicate it. Repression is a negative in democracies and 
will lengthen the duration of a terrorist organization (Eubank, 1994). For non-democratic 
regimes, coercive techniques will deter people’s engagement in terrorist groups. Terrorists and 
legitimate governments fight for the popular support of the people (Daxecker and Hess, 2013).  
The type of regime a country has is in direct correlation to the longevity of a terrorist 
group, as the government’s policies will either feed the terrorist recruitment or terminate it. 
Because democracies have the social and political standards of civil rights and liberties, 
oppression, even to a terrorist organization, is not socially accepted. This can actually generate 
sympathy for the terrorist group, feeding the group with civilian support. In trying to create 
policy goals which will rid the country of terrorism, the government makes people question its 
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own legitimacy as they use harsh and excessive force to terminate terrorism (Daxecker & Hess, 
pg.7). 
There is also as issue of generating the perfect policy to counteract terrorism in a 
democracy, as leaders of democratic nations will be influenced by fear in making counter 
terrorist decisions that are too harsh, since the public may rebel against this and ask for a change 
in leadership. This is not an issue non-democratic regimes deal with, as their government leaders 
are not as accountable to their citizens. Repression is usually their social standard, so putting 
more pressure on repressive policies can decrease the terrorist group recruitment. Leaders of 
non-democratic regimes can be more coercive and forceful towards counterterrorism policies as 
they are not as replaceable as democratic leaders, and don’t need the approval of the general 
public. This study’s conclusions are clear for democracies. Oppressive policies towards terrorism 
can result in a negative outcome for the country’s government, so selective measures need to be 
used in battling terrorism in democracies (Daxecker & Hess, 2013).  
The policy making in non-democratic nations is far more complex than the 
counterterrorism decisions made in democratic nations. Although repression will work to combat 
terrorism, this will not be the long term solution. The long term result of oppression can produce 
widespread rebellion as popular discontent will spread. In some cases this long-run issue can also 
impact the short term solution of oppression (Daxecker & Hess, 2013).  
Willingness to Compromise 
Another external factor which can lead a terrorist organization away from violence is the 
willingness of the host country to compromise and meet the demands of a terrorist organization. 
The possibility of peaceful transition from violence for the terrorist organization, can be achieved 
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through a settlement between the country and the organization (Bull, pg. 74). Jones and Libicki 
talk about the breath of terrorist goals and how some can be easily achieved through alliances 
and treaties with a legitimate government. Governments have a great role in determining the fate 
of terrorist organizations as shown by the measurement of terrorist groups from 1968 to 2006, as 
43% of terrorist groups were terminated through political negotiations (Wood, pg.64). 
Terrorist groups generally look for political recognition, so in order to compromise or 
understand the main aims of a terrorist organization, some countries separate the violent 
terroristic tactics from the root agendas of an organization (Rapoport, 2006). This in theory has 
sound logic, but there are risks involved with dealing with the root causes. The issue in this 
policy is the contradiction to the democratic process, as a compromise with a terrorist 
organization, to create political change, may conflict with the nation’s social and political 
standards. Democratic citizens organize their social and political lives with the trust that their 
government will uphold certain laws and regulations, compromising with a terrorist organization 
can be the antithesis of the values and political morals set forth by the people and the 
government of a given democratic nation. Another problem in this factor is government’s 
indirectly reinforcing terrorism as a means of obtaining political goals. This can increase the 
productivity and strength of existing terrorist groups and can turn the citizens against its 
government (Rapoport, pg.258). This factor could create a greater breeding ground for the 
terrorist organization as people learn to turn to terrorism any time they want to obtain political 
change. 
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Military/Policing  
External entities can also determine the transition of terrorist groups away from violence, 
by executing attacks against the group. According to Jones and Libicki the best option for ending 
terrorism within a given area would be to use the option of policing (pg.27). Some scholars 
(Clutterbuck, 2004; Ross and Gurr, pg.409-410; Nacos, pg.195) agree with this assessment and 
also conclude the best way to eradicate such groups is to use police methods. Police forces 
within a given country know more about the local area and its citizens, compared to 
federal/statewide forces or military wings, since it is the police that locally patrols and deal with 
local crime.  
The domestic police force has a home turf advantage over the military in dealing with 
terrorist groups. The military on the other hand has a lot more resources and the skill set to 
diminish a terrorist group altogether though armed fighting. The military would use a more 
invasive and violent means of strategy when dealing with these organizations as their task would 
be to kill and destroy the group physically, whereas the police would treat terrorism as a crime. 
Democracies have well established legal systems and other process to deal with crime.  
Terrorist engage themselves in many criminal activities and the easiest way to track them 
and catch them would be by placing the criminal justice system at the heart of counterterrorism 
policies (Nacos p.195). A study which measures the end of terrorist groups around the world 
from 1968 to 2006 lists that 7% of the groups were terminated due to military force, while 40% 
ended due to policing (Nacos, p.195). The study of Jones and Libicki cites the invasion of the 
Turkish government into the Kurdistan Workers party, where a physical attack from the states 
military force was called to kill and destroy the terrorist group (pg.12).  
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Although military attacks or policing can terminate terrorist groups, there is another 
minimalistic approach to terminate terrorist organizations. There is evidence which shows how 
targeting the leader of a terrorist group can cause the scattering of member’s and the terrorist 
groups’ eventual transition away from violence (Perliger and Weinberg, pg.17). Looking at this 
factor from the point of view of counterterrorism, arresting the leader of an organization, rather 
than killing him, is a more effective defeat for the terrorist group (Brown, pg. 392).  
An example of this factor is the capture and eventual death of Che Guevara by the 
Bolivian Army in October 1967, Guevara became an influential figure for leftist and separatist 
movements, encouraging further violence (Brown, 2010). The elimination of a terrorist 
organization’s leader can also be advantageous to the group. Eliminating the leadership in a 
group may create splintering of members into smaller groups. This can mean the groups still 
have the same agenda and ideologies but they become much more agile and efficient in their 
tasks. This also increases the connections between the groups as they adapt and react to 
situations much faster as the structure of the group allows for quick change (Keller and Desouza, 
2010). 
On the other side of this factor, the positives of eliminating terrorist group leaders can 
raise questions to their authority and credibility, as the leaders control will be undermined, 
severing their connection to the terrorist organization (Brown, pg.392). This counterterrorism 
technique threatens the effectiveness of a terrorist group as it puts a target on their leader. 
Exterior intent to attack forces the terrorist to use much of its security measures, resources, and 
time to protect its leader, leaving them vulnerable to attack (Price, 2012). The idea of an external 
entity focusing on a singular target, which in turn will cause internal issues to arise in a terrorist 
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organization has been used to take down organizations previously. The terrorist group of the 
Kurdistan People’s Party started to transition away from violence after the arrest of its leader.   
Through his study, Bryan Prince, evaluates this factor and speaks about how targeting the 
leader of a terrorist group is an effective way to damage the organization. He puts an importance 
on six specific variables, the internal organization of the terrorist group, the value of its leader, 
when the leader is targeted, group size, leadership turnover, method of execution and ideology of 
the terrorist groups (pg. 43). These are the variables he uses to validate this factor of a terrorist 
group being drawn away from violence to eventually meet its end because of the 
counterterrorism policy of leadership targeting. This paper will use the categories and factors to 
focus on answering the main research questions of how, when and why terrorist organization 
transition away from violence.  
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ILLUSTRATIONS/EXAMPLES OF CATEGORIES AND FACTORS 
Category I: Internal Factors  
Splinter Away From Main Group 
The category of internal intent and decision making transitioning a terrorist group away 
from violence depends on several factors. The first factor is the splintering of members from one 
terrorist group to another. When members of one terrorist group leave the group to join another 
group, the original terrorist organization is weakened. Depending on the amount of people 
migrating out of the group, a large outflow from the organization can risk its existence and 
ability to inflict harm. A historic example of a splinter that caused weakness to spread in the 
original terrorist organization occurred in the IRA.  
The roots of the IRA’s conquest for national independence from Great Britain lead back to the 
creation of the United Kingdom.  In the year 1801, the English Protestant (Anglican) United Kingdom of 
Great Britain united with Roman Catholic Ireland. These Protestant Irish were also known as Unionists, 
as they supported the union of Great Britain and Ireland.  For several hundred years the Catholic Irish 
nationalists opposed the Unionists. 
It was from 1919 to 1921, that the first IRA fought with the British in the Irish War of 
Independence. At the end of the war, Ireland was divided into two parts, the Catholic Irish Free State and 
the Protestant Northern Ireland, which was still united with the British, and became the Ulster province.  
This negotiation between the two parties was not satisfactory with some members of the 
IRA and resulted into a split in the group. This split caused two factions in the terrorist 
organization, the first still being led by Collins, who supported the treaty, and the second being 
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led by Eamon De Valera, who disagreed with the negotiations. The group led by Collins became 
Irish Free State Army (English, 2005). 
This first split shows how different attitudes and beliefs in a terrorist organization can be 
dangerous to the group existence. The disagreement about the first negotiations caused a civil 
war in the group and weakened the organization due to the original group loosing members.  
The IRA lost a portion of its members to this failed splinter group, but some still refused 
to give up arms to accept defeat. IRA continued to recruit and carried on illegal activities. The 
government became even more oppressive towards the organization after the violent use of 
terrorism. They introduced regulations like provision for internment without trial  (English, 
2005). 
 In the 1960s the Catholics in Northern Ireland started a campaign, which brought up the 
discrimination against coting, housing and employment by the protestant government. The 
dominant Protestant police force did not stop extremists from using violence against the Catholic 
protestors, escalating the anger and friction between the two parties (English, 2005). 
 This escalation of violence caused another split in the IRA in 1969. This time they 
divided into two more groups, making the “provisional” wing the group that wanted violent 
terroristic tactics in order to have a government that didn’t include the British. The start of 1970 
saw a reign of terror from the provisional wing, with bombings, ambushes, and assassinations. 
They wanted to use this terror to destabilize mainland Britain and then spread to Central Europe 
(Sharma, 2005).  
The IRA began using terrorist attacks to fight against the British army and police force in 
Northern Ireland. The free Irish state only included Southern Ireland. After violent attacks 
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against the British and Irish Unionist targets, talks between Sinn Fein and the British government 
started taking place in 1994.  
 The Sinn Fein leaders wanted to end the armed struggle between the IRA and the Irish 
and British governments. In August of 1994 the IRA announced a cease-fire. IRA’s political 
representatives were included in the multiparty talks starting in September 1997. And just a year 
after the representatives approved the Good Friday Agreement between the parties of the British 
government, Irish government, and the IRA (English, 2005). 
 The issue in splinter groups is that the central group that all members started out from can 
never again have the amount of power it originally had. The main group weakens as the 
members branch out due to differences within the terrorist organization. These disagreements 
cause a change in ideology and tactics, and transform the terrorist organization into different 
groups. The splintering of members from one group can weaken a terrorist organization and lead 
them away from violence. The main organization loses most of its violent tactics, as the more 
violent members form splinter groups that use focus mostly on terroristic violence to attain goals, 
as seen by the example of the provisional IRA splitting from the main IRA (Jones and Libicki, 
2008).  
Shift Towards Mainstream Politics  
A terrorist groups transition towards mainstream politics is another internal factor which 
leads the group away from terrorism. The organization of some terrorist groups allows for an 
easy transition to a political party that will engage in legitimate politics to bring about change. 
One of these groups is the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). It is especially easy for some terrorist 
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organization, like the ETA, to converge into mainstream politics as they may have previously 
decided to pursue relations with the government through peace agreements.  
 The ETA was founded in 1959 as a call for Basque freedom. This terrorist organization 
was born during the oppressive state of Dictator General Francisco Franco. The group was 
started by a group of youths from the Basque region, due to their dissatisfaction with the civil 
war of Basque nationalists and Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Bourne pg. 3).  
The ETA wanted to establish a socialist state, this state also included areas of Spain and 
France. The ETA is a violent terrorist organization and is responsible for the death of 829 people, 
with countless victims of injuries, and many kidnappings. The group is identified as a terrorist 
organization in the United States as well as many of its allies around the world. The ETA used to 
provoke state repression, which would eventually gather popular insurrection against the 
government of Spain. This formed the tactic of using violence in order to get states to negotiate 
and meet the demands of the terrorist group (Bourne, 2013). 
They wanted to convey the idea that the Spanish government is completely anti-Basque 
and the democracy it presents its citizens with is the same as Francoism. The ETA represented 
the struggle of the Basque nation and wanted the powers of a legitimate government. In order to 
participate in the mainstream political process, the ETA announced a cease-fire on September 5, 
2010. They later, on October 20, 2011, declared a final and full cessation of its violent armed 
attacks (“Basque group ETA says armed campaign is over”).  
The political party of Batasuna also has the same political goals as the terrorist group of 
ETA. They have also never condemned the act and use of violence from the ETA. This party was 
also known as Euskal herritarrok and Herri Batasuna. Investigations on the linkages between the 
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two groups have been made as the two parties, ETA and Batasuna, share a lot of the same 
members. Although the party refuses to be labeled as a simple political wing of the ETA, in 
order to avoid citizen discontent towards the political party, they have a membership overlap 
with the ETA as their participants have similar political agendas. (Bourne, 2013).   
Terrorist groups that have fulfilled their goals are more likely to make the decision to 
transition into mainstream politics. Once the group has fulfilled its political agenda by suing 
violent tactics, the group transitions away from violence as they no longer have a goal to 
rationalize attacks for. Members may still want to be involved in the political process and the 
transition into mainstream politics is made.   
The Irgun Zvai Leumi (Natioal Military Organization) was a terrorist organization that 
wanted to attain power for the Jewish people. The group was originally founded by 1931 under 
the leadership of Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the group at this point did not engage in violent attacks. It 
was in 1939 when the group’s leaders started to believe that violent attacks are needed to attain 
their goals. Jabotinsky’s doctrine of Revisionist Zionism is what influenced this group, making it 
a secondary Zionist military group. The doctrine asked them to put pressure on Great Britain so 
that Jewish statehood could be established. They also wanted no further interference form the 
British and wanted to expel them from the region (Brenner, pg.4). 
The event, which marked the Irgun’s transition to violence, was the King David Hotel 
bombing on July 22, 1946. This attack resulted in the death of around a hundred people, this 
population included British, Jews, and Arabs (Fromkin, pg.688). Although the group claims that 
the death of these people was an accident, others refuse to believe this and caused the Irgun’s 
popularity to dive down.  
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In 1948, after nine years of existence the Irgun attained its goal of having a Jewish state. 
Although this goal was not achieved directly by the methods and strategies of the Irgun, the 
organization was satisfied with the change and the terrorist group started its transition away from 
violence. The Irgun wanted power for the Jewish people and this goal was fulfilled, even if not 
entirely through their efforts. The declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel was 
called on by the United Nations General Assembly.  The natural right of the Jewish people was 
attained by the creation of their own sovereign state (Ben-Gurion, 1948). The terrorist group, 
Irgun, is no longer engaged in terrorism, but has not left the political scene completely. The 
Irgun started a movement, led by its leaders, aiming to remain in the legitimate sphere of politics 
in Israel. The Irgun transitioned into a political party named Heurt, showcasing a successful 
transition away from violence and into mainstream politics.  
Terrorist Group Networking 
The last factor of internal decision making and intent is a terrorist group’s involvement in 
the network of other terrorist groups. The willingness of a group to participate in having relations 
with another other organization can determine the transition of the group away from violence.   
The Sendero Luminiso (Shining Path) of Peru claims to be influenced by Marxism and 
embodies Peruvian Marxism. The goal of this organization was to launch attacks against the 
Peruvian govern to replace the bourgeois democracy with New Democracy, a democracy which 
is not influenced by the liberal capitalism that western countries adopt. Abimael Guzman, a quiet 
and reserved man who had confidence in the conservative Andean intellectual, founded the 
terrorist group. Guzman was from a middle class family and transferred over to Huamanga in 
1962, he took on the job of a university philosophy professor. He already knew the importance of 
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Marxists thought, as he belonged to the Communist Party of Peru-Red Flag till 1970. He left the 
organization at that time due to the group’s unwillingness to take up arms against the Peruvian 
government. He then splintered away from the organization and formed the Shining Path. He 
started to give lectures and speeches on scientific socialism and gained the title “Dr. Shamu” 
garnered from his ability brainwash the listeners (Starn pg.404).  
The Shining Path took on the identity of a peasant rebellion directed by Guzman. This 
organization had a fertile recruitment as there were many who were discontent with the 
government of Peru. These members were happy to fight back the corrupt authorities to form a 
new just order. Although the Peruvian governmnet offered elections, for the first time, the 
Shining Path refused to participate, showcasing the need of violence in their political agenda. 
The group’s first act of violence was on May 17, 1980 when they burned ballot boxes in the 
town of Chuschi. The group started to gather members in the Andean highlands and started filing 
in the political void and providing justice to local peasants. The government had never taken the 
insurgency seriously, Interior Minister Jose Maria de la Jara, said the group could be easily taken 
down by the governments police force (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación).  
On December 29, 1981 the government finally called an emergency state, regarding the 
Andean regions. But the military abused the power the government gave them and arrested 
innocent people, raped women and tortured the suspected.  This was also reflected on to 
Guzman’s thinking of violence being the way to change and revolution, the Shining Path 
believed the Ashninka, indigenous Peruvians, had collaborated with the army and so they 
slaughtered sixty-five indigenous Peruvians, including spearing children as they promised the 
continuation of the “Peoples war” (Starn pg.411). 
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The Peruvian government started a reign of terror against the Shining path from 1983 to 
1984 and in the process they left burned crops, murdered villagers and homeless citizens in their 
path. The response of the party was to become even more violent to protect and defend 
themselves against the government’s armed forces. The terrorist group responded with the “mass 
executions of villages in Cochas, Uchuraccy, Humanaguilla, Chaca, Huayllo and Sivia” (Starp 
pg. 419). Although the Shining Path claimed to be fighting for the poor, more than fifteen 
thousand Andean peasants had died by 1994. Six hundred thousand more people migrated away 
from this violence to shantytowns in Lima and Ayacucho. The war between the government and 
the Shining Path became the dirty war and turned the south-central Ander into the time of fear 
(Starn pg. 419).  
The Peruvian police captured Guzman, along with several other leaders, on September 
12, 1992. The police captured the leaders above a dance studio in the district of Lima (Rochlin 
2003). The Shining Path continued its attacks and the use of other terroristic violence. As time 
flew by the ground for recruitment was drying out and the terrorist group was suffering as their 
attacks were not as powerful as before. The terrorist group made a self-limiting choice to involve 
its self in the terrorist group network, by working with another organization. The Shining Path 
refused to attach itself with another organization if it meant that they would be put under 
unwanted attention from officials (Phillips, pg.337).  
There are benefits to joining together with another terrorist group as terrorist groups have 
globalized in the modern era, and have members in more than one geographic area. Terrorist 
groups are also aware of the presence and threat of other terrorist groups. Groups may get-
together and share resources, members and tactics but the more likely situation is how 
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competition fuels terrorist groups. Although cooperation could make terrorist groups stronger the 
expectation of them isolating is more likely. 
Terrorist groups are aware of the fact that if they do aid another terrorist group or effort 
they would have to share resources, information, recruitment pool, and existing members with 
the other group. The terrorists rather focus their energy on targeting the governments they are 
fighting against (Phillips pg.1).  
The previously mentioned terrorist group, the Shining Path, rejects the idea of a terrorist 
network being useful. This terrorist organization refuses to help or aid another organization and 
also does not work with them (McCormick, 2001). Terrorist organizations also understand that 
joining or helping another terrorist group can bring them unwanted attention from the 
government of their country. Terrorist groups can join together and have greater attacks, 
becoming a threat the government would prioritize to eliminate. The Shining Path refused to 
make the decision to join another group and continued its attacks with the dwindling membership 
it had, it lost out on the members and other resources it would have gained through a partnership. 
Eventually the movement lost the control it has previously to bid for power in the region 
(McCormick pg. 51). 
Category II: External Factors  
Regime Type 
The second category, which deals with external factors that affect the transition of a 
terrorist organization from violence, emphasizes the importance regime type, among other 
factors. There is a danger in democratic nations creating policies that will heavily oppress 
terrorist groups. This can be a mistake on the part of the government as this strategy can generate 
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sympathy for the terrorists, and create a breeding ground for recruitment. Non-democratic 
regimes do not have to be as cautious in creating oppressive counter terrorism policies, as they 
are not accountable to their citizens like democratic nations are. Non-democratic nations already 
have the factor of oppression in their society, so citizens have been more exposed to this 
treatment then democratic citizens. 
Policies that are oppressive towards terrorists and require the government to intervene in 
citizens’ daily lives may be opposed by the citizens of a given country, so governments taking 
smaller steps can yield a more successful result.  Governments using series of laws and 
regulations, rather than quick and massive changes to fight terrorism will garner a more 
successful result. The Red Army Faction is an example of how a group can come to an end if this 
theory is practiced correctly. 
The origin of the Red Army Faction (RAF) was in West Germany in 1970.. This group 
characterized itself as a far left militia group. The government of West Germany declared this 
organization to be a terrorist group when a member, Dümlein Christine, was punished for being a 
part of the RAF terrorist organization (Smith and Moncourt pg. 566).   
The group targeted most of its protests against the so-called American imperialists. This 
meant the US military and the German political and business leaders. This group usually carried 
out protests in a non-violent manner until June of 1967 (Levy pg.11). At that time, deadly violent 
riots broke out against US involvement in Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict. One student was 
killed by police, leading to massive popular discontent. 
The violence escalated from 1970 to 1979, as the RAF was responsible for the death of 
31 people, injuring more than 100 people and had taken 163 hostages, while being responsible 
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for 25 bombings. The Attorney general of West Germany was also a victim of this group’s 
terrorism, as was the head of national employer association, and other American soldiers who 
were stationed in West Germany (Levy pg. 11).  
The response of the West Germany government varied across time. One of these 
counterterrorist measures included making citizens take loyalty oaths towards its German 
government. People found this strategy to be ineffective and intrusive. In 1976, Germany 
declared the formation of terrorist groups to be illegal. There were other changes made with the 
support of the law, to increase police powers. The police was allowed to search the homes and 
possessions of suspected parties with the approval of the court. The police also created 
checkpoints on roadways to search suspicious travelers (Levy pg.13). The threat of terrorism 
pushed West Germany to increase their intelligence-gathering agencies and they also created an 
anti-terrorist reaction unit. This unit was responsible for handling any terrorist attacks that 
occurred in the country, as they could assemble in 15 minutes and deploy within an hour with 
helicopters, high-tech weapons and special land vehicles.  
But the government of West Germany also gave concessions to the RAF, especially when 
dealing with hostage situations. Instead of slowing the group down, the RAF now took more 
hostages and had greater demands, like releasing the group’s members from prison. It was 1975, 
when the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reversed this policy of dealing with 
terrorists and refused to give into the RAFs demands when they had hostages in the West 
German embassy in Sweden. The terrorists then murdered two diplomats and also blew up the 
entire embassy. Once the embassy was blown up, two of the terrorists were killed instantly and 
the remaining four were sent to prison after being tried in West Germany (Levy pg.13). 
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It was in the early 1980s when the RAF membership was dwindling out, due to the 
unyielding counter terrorist policies the government created against this group, members were 
being arrested. The grounds for recruitment was getting smaller and smaller. In April 1998, a 
letter written by the RAF was given to the Reuters news agency declaring that the RAF has been 
dissolved and that they had failed to accomplish their objective (Pluchinsky pg.137).  
The dissolution of the RAF show cases that the cases discussed in this study are used 
illustrate the biggest factor which led to its demise. There can be several causes to the end of 
these terrorist groups, but the factors mentioned in the paper are the leading causes of the demise 
of the listed terrorist organizations. The RAF transitioned away from violence due to the 
government’s strict counterterrorist policies (Levy pg. 13), but the paper also acknowledges the 
existence of other unlisted factors which caused the group to end.  
Willingness to Compromise 
The second factor within the external intent and decision, is the willingness of the 
government to comply and make peace with the terrorist organization, effect the group’s 
transition away from violence. Because terrorist groups are looking to generate political change, 
the acknowledgement of their political aims and reaching a compromise between the terrorist 
group and the government can be beneficial to both parties. An agreement or treaty between the 
two parties can be beneficial to the government, in political means, the riots and protests will 
decrease, economically, the government wouldn’t have to spend money on security, and fixing 
the damaged infrastructure, and socially, citizens will live in a more peaceful and safe 
environment. 
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The Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) is a leftist terrorist 
organization that originated and spread terror in El Salvador (Jones and Libicki pg.23). The 
group was named after Farabundo Marti, a communist revolutionary Salvadorian who led an 
unsuccessful revolt in 1932, when the economic and social structure of El Salvador was suffering 
a depression. The goals of this terrorist group was to shift the Salvadorian government to a 
communist political system in order to end oppression, and to seek land reforms that would 
create better economic conditions for the oppressed (Jones and Libicki pg.64, 67).  
Historically, the political system of El Salvador can be defined as elites resisting political 
change. The country’s economy is based primarily on export agriculture, and a system of 
exploitation and abuse. Due to the abuse and mistreatment of workers, the politically and 
economically oppressed citizens began to protest. Looking at the protestors who challenged the 
status quo, the government started to implement oppressive policies towards the people. This in 
turn, further angered the people and generated violence within the protests. Several members of 
the FMLN have used these oppressive tactics, employed by the government and elites, as the 
excuse to why they joined this terrorist group in the first place. (Jones and Libicki pg.67).  
The oppressive policies of the government gave rise to the FMLN attacks against the 
Salvadorian government and the civilians who supported it. The Salvadorian government was 
incentivized to make changes in the political, economic and social sectors of the country from 
the kidnappings, bombings, and arson the FMLN carried out (Call, 2002). Due to the great 
amount of people oppressed by the Salvadorian government, the recruiting ground in the country 
was very fertile. Eventually the FMLN included more than 12,000 combatants who took up more 
than one-thirds of the country (Jones and Libicki pg. 68).  
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The end of the cold war created an opportunity for the Salvadorian government to extend 
their hand out to the FMLN for peace. The Salvadorian government was under pressure from the 
US to not yield to the FMLN, but after the cold war, with the loss of Soviet Union against the 
US, and the new administration with George H. W. Bush, the government of El Salvador decided 
to form a peace settlement with the FMLN (Wood 2000).  
The government started negotiation talks mid-1989 with the FMLN, and the Geneva 
Agreement of April 1990 paved the way for negotiations to progress between the El Salvadorian 
government and the FMLN, making the end of the armed conflict between the two parties. The 
five stages, which ended with the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords, declared a political 
compromise between the government and the FMLN. This agreement transitioned the 
government to a democratic political regime, with a capitalist economy. From then on the two 
groups decide to solve their differences through democratic political process (Jones and Libicki 
pg.73). The change in nature of the government to extend peace and compromise towards the 
FMLN allowed the terrorist group to transition away from violence.  
Military/Policing 
The last factor in the category of external intent and decision is the use of military or 
police intervention to attain the transition of terrorist groups away from violence (Cronin pg.30). 
An ongoing debate shows how the identity and type of terrorist organization is what will 
determine if a police intervention, or military attack will be useful. Although there are benefits to 
each option, it really is the terrorist group and the situation a government finds itself in that will 
decide whether military, or police force is required. 
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There have been many interventions and attacks over the world aiming to disband 
terrorism from a specific geographical region. One of these includes the Turkish military attacks 
was against the Kurdistan Workers Party also known as Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK).  
The PKK occupies a spot on the terrorism black list for Turkey and its allies. The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, a military alliance that Turkey has been a part of since 1952, 
declared PKK to be a terrorist group ("NATO chief declares PKK terrorist group"). Another 
organization, the European Union (EU), also labels the PKK to be a terrorist organization. 
Although the PKK was prescribed to be removed from the EU’s terror list, the EU officials 
dismissed the ruling and stated that the PKK would remain on the list (Schomberg, 2008). The 
PKK is also on the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list created by the US State 
Department. 
The PKK is a terrorist organization based in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. This terrorist 
organization began in 1974 by a group of Kurdish students with the leadership of Abdullah 
Ocalan at the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University. In 1978 the PKK begin a 
communist revolution by the techniques of guerilla warfare, in the heart of Turkey, Ankara 
(Criss, 1995). Ocalan learned about the exploitation of Kurds in Southeast Turkey and thought 
that the Kurds should be able to determine their own fate and not be punished for wanting an 
independent and sovereign state (Poluton, 1997). The Kurds make up 18%-25% of the 
population in Turkey and have been oppressed in the country for decades, this is the motivation 
for the PKK to wage attacks against the Turkish state for political and social right to freedom 
(Kreyenbroken, 2005).  
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The group began with presenting itself as a worldwide communist revolution. While this 
organization was a Marxist-Leninist organization, they eventually mutated towards having goals 
of national autonomy and wanting Democratic Confederalism. Democratic Confederalism, 
according to Abdullah Ocalan, is a socialist political system with roots in libertarian beliefs. This 
system is open and free towards different political groups and it’s multi-cultural and non-
monopolistic in nature, making it consensus-oriented (Oclan, 2007).  
The PKK, in the time frame of 1978 to 1984, ambushed, sabotaged, and created riots, 
protests and demonstrations against the Turkish government. The organization rationalized these 
attacks to be a defense of the Turkish population as they were being culturally oppressed. The 
Turkish government’s 1983 Turkish Language Act Ban could support this explanation, along 
with the other cultural rights taken away from the Kurds by the government in the region. The 
language ban stopped the use of Kurdish language from offices, schools and any other official 
capacities (McDowall, 2001). 
The second wave which lasted from 1984 to 1999, made attacks on the government’s 
important institutions all over the country. The point and purpose of these attacks was to 
destabilize and weaken the government. The PKK also went through with suicide bombings in 
this time period, on government and police institutions and tourist sites (Matovic 2007).  The 
Turkish government created several counter-insurgency operations against the PKK, announcing 
the state of emergency in the several PKK controlled territories (Robins, 1993).  
The Kenyan government transferred Ocalan to Turkey in February of 1998, after Turkish 
police arrested him. He was charged at a State Security Court for treason in trying to separate 
part of the country from the government control and sentenced to death. This sentence was 
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upheld in November and this case is in front of the European Court of Human Rights (“Annual 
Report”).  
Due to the PKK being integrated into the Turkish society, an international force of 
military or police would not be effective in harming the organization. The Turkish military was 
right for this job as they knew the domestic layout of the organization and had a home turf 
advantage. The Turkish government has carried out several air strikes and artillery strikes in the 
region, even with the warning of the United States and Iraq to back off (“Iraq warns Turkey over 
incursion”).  The constant military attacks the PKK suffers at the hands of the Turkish 
government has exhausted the organization and the leader of the organization, Abdullah Ocalan, 
has announced the end of armed struggle and called for a cease fire through peace talks on 
March 21, 2013 (“PKK leader calls for ceasefire in Turkey”). These peace talks helped the PKK 
transition away from violence. There have been recent attacks in Turkey labeled to be the work 
of the TAK (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks), an offshoot of the PKK. This group has been separated 
from the PKK as they did not agree with the cease-fire and formed another group in 2004 
(“Ankara blast: Kurdish group TAK claims bombing”). Still, the PKK may be returning to 
violence, as it has claimed responsibility for bombings in Turkey as recently as March 2016. 
Thus, the PKK can be seen as an organization that has transitioned both from and back to violent 
acts. 
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TABLE 1 
This table contains an overview of the categories and factors discussed in the sections above. 
CATEGORY FACTOR DESCRIPTION  EXAMPLE 
Internal Splinter away 
from main group  
Splintering and dividing from 
a group to form, or merge into 
a new group can weaken the 
original organization and 
generate cracks in ideology 
and strength of the main 
organization. Makes the 
original group move towards 
nonviolent means. 
The several splits in the 
IRA, weakened the 
central organization and 
led it away from 
violence (Mesquita, pg. 
400). 
Internal Movement to 
mainstream 
politics  
Some terrorist groups take on 
the legitimate political path, 
through participating in 
government with the use of 
legitimate non-violent group 
such as political parties. 
The ETA transitioned to 
mainstream politics as it 
transitioned away from 
violent tactics 
(Tremlett, 2011). 
Internal Terrorist group 
network 
Some group choose not to 
work with other terrorist 
groups, despite the benefits, 
this can have a dangerous 
Peru’s Shining Path 
refuses to collaborate 
with other terrorist 
groups. Collaboration 
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effect on the power of a 
terrorist group. 
 
can generate greater 
attention from 
governments, 
dangerous for terrorist 
groups (Phillips pg. 
337) 
External Regime type The type of government and 
the counterterrorism polices it 
generates has a direct effect 
on the terrorist groups 
transition away from violence.  
Germany used a variety 
of different strategies to 
combat the terrorist 
group of RAF. RAF 
was defeated due to 
strict regulations of the 
government’s anti-
terrorism policies. 
(Levy, 2001). 
External Government’s 
willingness to 
compromise 
Depending on the country’s 
willingness to compromise 
with the terrorist group, 
peaceful means of ending the 
group is possible through goal 
fulfillment. 
FMLN disarmed after 
the Chapultepec Peace 
Accords, and 
transitioned away from 
violent attacks (Jones 
and Libicki, pg. 22-23). 
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External Policing/Military  The police and military 
intervention and attack on a 
terrorist group physically 
stops the group from maintain 
its capabilities and resources 
and generates the groups 
move towards nonviolence. 
Turkish government 
won the fight against 
the PKK, through 
several attacks from the 
police and military. 
(Jones and Libicki, 
pg.12) 
 
The success of these factors is measured through the end of the terrorist organizations 
used to illustrate them. The groups’ transition away from violence, loss of membership, and/or 
its end, accounts for the success of the leading factor it is illustrating. 
  The factors listed above can be analyzed further by being assigning ranks to their 
successes. The rankings can be made in both categories, internal and external. The internal 
category, which deals with the decision and intent of terrorist organization from within include 
several different factors. The most successful factor in eliminating terrorist organizations is a 
terrorist organizations refusal to participate in a terrorist group network. This is the most 
successful in the category as it damages not only the terrorist organization, but the network as a 
whole. The second most successful factor in the category is the groups’ movement from 
mainstream politics as the terrorist group no longer uses methods of terrorism to achieve its 
political objectives. The least successful factor in the internal category is the splintering of a 
terrorist group away from the central organization. This causes a weakness in the main 
organization but it still results in the newly parted terrorist group.  
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 The external category deals with decisions and policies created by governments and other 
entities outside of the terrorist organization. The most successful factor in this category is the 
government’s willingness to compromise with a terrorist organization. This is the most effective 
factor as a face to face peace settlement leaves little to no room for the terrorist organization to 
take up arms again, as they will be politically satisfied. The regime type of a country and the 
decisions it makes is the second most effective as the policies the govern makes to combat 
terrorism can get rid of the terrorist threat, it can also anger citizens and cause civil unrest in the 
general population. The least effective factor in this category is the policing or military attack at 
a terrorist organization. An attack can target and eliminate a terrorist group, but it can produce 
survivors who will locate somewhere else to continue terrorist activities. Although all of the 
factors threaten the security and existence of a terrorist organization this classification analyzes 
which factors would be most successful. 
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ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
How and why do terrorist groups decide to abandon violent behavior and/ or transition 
away from violence, or into the mainstream? The paper answers these research questions by 
creating an original categorization of factors which allow or force terrorist groups to achieve this 
transition. Six such factors are organized in two categories. In Category One (Internal), a terrorist 
group’s transition to non-violence or disintegration is the result of a decision or action of the 
terrorist group itself. Category Two (External), sees the transition to non-violence as a result of 
factors external to the terrorist group (government actions, police-military campaigns or regime 
type).  
The factors which have been categorized in this paper are illustrated with real world 
examples. In Category One cases, the decisions made by the terrorist group itself determine its 
fate. The three factors discussed in this category: decision to split/ merge with another group, 
decision to merge into mainstream politics, decision to network with other terrorist groups, 
illustrate this point. The splintering of terrorist members from one group to form or join another 
group can cause systemic weakness in the main organization. As members and resources are 
being taken away from the main hub of the terrorist organization, the group will never be as 
powerful as it was before at its peak capacity. The IRA went through several splits and 
regroupings, and this caused so changes in the ideology and goals of the group, weakening the 
terrorist organization. Once splits start to take place the main organization its vulnerability 
increases and its transition or termination becomes more likely. 
Under various circumstances, terrorist groups may consider moving to legitimate routes. 
Such routes may mean that terrorist groups seek to be recognized as official parties that can bring 
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about political change. This was the case with the ETA in Spain. The ETA has transitioned from 
using violent terrorism to focusing on generating support for the political parties its members are 
a part of. 
The decision to network with other terrorist groups can be regarded as a double edged 
sword. On one hand, it can strengthen the group through the availability of more information and 
resources and cooperation. Still, networking makes a terrorist group more visible and may attract 
unwanted attention from the authorities. On the other hand, complete isolation of a group, and 
the conscientious decision not to collaborate or network with others may considerably weaken a 
group, as seen in the example of the Shining Path. 
In Category Two cases, factors external to the terrorist group play a key role in its 
transition: government type/ regime type, government’s decisions to initiate military or policing 
actions, and government willingness to work with or compromise with terrorist groups. 
Depending on the given regime of a country, and their laws against terrorist groups, 
terrorist groups can thrive or decline. A government needs to find the balance between strict 
rules and regulations to combat terrorism, and respect for civil liberties. The combination of the 
two will make sure terrorist groups cannot recruit citizens. Thus, as regime typology goes, 
democracy is more conducive to the decline of terrorism. But, as seen by the case of the Red 
Army Faction in Germany, compromising with a terrorist group and giving into their demands 
all the time can be dangerous, as they may refuse to cooperate and continue to use violence to 
attain their goals. Still the literature shows that democratic regimes are more likely to see a 
decline in terrorism over the years than non-democratic regimes. 
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Attacking a terrorist group with police or military force is also a way in which 
governments bring about the decline of violent terrorist groups. Governments make case-by-case 
decisions in regard to using force against a terrorist group in a given region. This paper used the 
example of PKK, as they were defeated by the Turkish military force. The decision to use the 
Turkish military was successful in the situation as many PKK members were active within 
Turkey. Given these circumstances, the Turkish military, which was well acquainted with the 
organizational ins and outs of the PKK, was the best tactical enemy of the PKK. This expertise 
allowed the military to defeat and deter the PKK for many years, and even capture its leader in 
1998. 
The leader of a terrorist group is an integral part of the structure of that terrorist 
organization. Even if the person is simply a figure head, their capture or the loss of their life is 
likely to cause the demise of an organization. Besides the case of Ocalan and the PKK, this was 
also the case with the Shining Path and its leader.  In the case of the Shining Path, once its 
leader, Guzman was targeted and killed by the government, the organization suffered a huge 
setback. Without the charisma and organizational skills of Guzman, the Shining Path started on a 
path of inevitable demise.  
Most terrorist groups, at their very core, want political change. Governments can 
acknowledge this and extend a hand to compromise with the group by creating a treaty where 
both parties are satisfied with the results and an end to violence can be brought about. The case 
of the FMLN in El Salvador settling down after signing a treaty with the government showcases 
how it is possible to have a peaceful resolution thanks to the government’s willingness to 
compromise.  
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This means that the political agendas of groups are met and they have no further 
incentive to extend the life of their organization. Such an accomplishment may or may not be the 
result of a government’s direct response to the group’s demands.  This was the case with the 
Irgun in Israel. The group wanted a sovereign nation of Israel and an independent nation was 
created due to external efforts and circumstances, regardless of the Irgun’s efforts.  Still, the 
group transitioned to peaceful integration into mainstream politics due to these goals being met. 
This example shows that after their political agenda is met, groups usually disappear into 
mainstream politics of the country and they learn to use the legitimate ways to achieve political 
change. 
This paper has researched factors and examples or terrorist groups which have ceased to 
exist or transitioned away from violence. This categorization does not include many of the 
Middle Eastern terrorist organizations that threaten the stability and security of the world today. 
The groups which have been influenced by Radical Islam have not experienced a demise. Due to 
the organizations being fairly current, it is hard to point out the concrete factosr that will lead to 
their transition away from violence.  
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